## ECONOMICS

What does it mean to me?
Part V: Ch 14-17
Pgs. 289-386

- Pure Comperition
- plonudoly
- Oligodolr
- IVIonodolistic Comperition
- Long Run/Short Run


## There are four distinct market models: 1) PURE COMPETITION <br> Large number of firms, standardized product, easy entry, "price takers".

## 2) PURE MONOPOLY

One firm--sole seller of a product, difficult entry, no effort to differentiate product
3) OLIGOPOLY

Few sellers, affected by rivals, must take decisions of others into account when determining its own strategies.
4) MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION

Large number of sellers, differentiated products, non-price competition, easy entry.

## Number of Firms?



## PURE

COMPETITION

## PERFECT COMPETITION




Are there any questions?
If there are, we're in trouble.
This is a basic supply and demand graph; the point at which they intersect is the point of maximum efficiency. Notice that price and quantity for the INDUSTRY are capital $P$ and capital $Q$.

Graphing for the firm will be more challenging.

## PERFECT COMPETITION



## ARE THERE ANY QUESTIONS??

## PERFECT COMPETITION



You are a farmer in this market. How many bushels of corn do you want to produce? Why?
a) small $q_{1}$

## Answer: The point at which MC=MR

## PERFECT COMPETITION



Let's look at each individual line to understand more about how firms decide production.

## Individual firms are price takers and will take the market price.

Hint: memorize this line for the AP test.

## PERFECT COMPETITION



P = Price
MR = Marginal Revenue
D = Demand
AR = Average Revenue

Why are they all equal?


Since the farm is a price taker, it must take the market price. Let's suppose that $P=\$ 2$, what is the demand $P$ at each $q$ ?

| $\mathbf{q}$ | $\mathbf{P}$ |
| :--- | :--- |
| 1 | $\$ 2$ |
| 2 | $\$ 2$ |
| 3 | $\$ 2$ |
| 4 | $\$ 2$ |



What do you get when you multiply $\mathrm{P} \times \mathrm{q}$ ?

TR

| $\mathbf{q}$ | $\mathbf{X}$ | $\mathbf{P}$ | $=$ |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 1 | $\$ 2$ | $\$ 2$ |  |
| 2 | $\$ 2$ | $\$ 4$ |  |
| 3 | $\$ 2$ | $\$ 6$ |  |
| 4 | $\$ 2$ | $\$ 8$ |  |

What is TR for each bushel sold?
Who do we appreciate?
THE FARMER

## WHY DO WE APPRECIATE THE FARMER?

1) How many of you ate breakfast this morning?
2) How many of you plan to eat lunch?
3) How about dinner?
4) How many of you grew your own food today?


What is the formula for MR?

| q | P | TR |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | \$2 | \$2 |
| 2 | \$2 | \$4 |
| 3 | \$2 | \$6 |
| 4 | \$2 | \$8 |




At each price of $\$ 2$, demand is ELASTIC. You can buy infinate amounts of corn at \$2. So.......

$$
D=P=M R
$$



How would you figure AR?

$A R=T R / q$
\$2

When I grew up on the farm, we lived next door to

## MR. PARD

People called him that because he knew so much about perfect competition.
When labeling the demand curve for perfect competition, MAKE SURE it is labeled

$$
M R=P=A R=D
$$


ALL firms masiontze profits
(and sminsinize losses) at
נR = لN
(Hint: tattoo this on your forehead)

## Economic



MC touches ATC at its lowest point.

Now we add ATC curve to the graph to determine if the firm is making an economic profit, economic loss or breaking even.


Whenever $P$ is above ATC at profit-maximizing quantity ( $q$ ), then the firm is earning a profit.
In this situation, $P$ is above ATC at profit-maximizing quantity (q).


Since the $P$ is above What is the formula for TR? ATC at the profitmaximizing output q, the firm is earning an economic profit.


What is the formula for TC? ATC $\mathrm{x} q$
Then $q \times$ ATC will give you the $T C=0, B, C, q$

Since the TR ( $0, \mathrm{p} 1$, $A, q)$ is larger than TC ( $0, B, C, q$ ), the company is making an economic profit
(B, C, A, $p_{1}$ ).


In the LONG RUN, when individuals see the firms are earning an economic profit (above normal rates of return), more firms will enter the market causing the industry market supply curve to shift to the right.


## How is this chart different from the previous chart reflecting an economic profit?

In this situation, $\mathbf{P}$ is below ATC at profit-maximizing quantity (q). This chart reflects a loss.


In the LONG RUN, when individuals see the firms are making an economic loss, firms will leave the market causing the industry market supply curve to shift down.

## Industry P goes up

Industry Q goes down
Firms' quantities go up.

$$
A J C=\| A P A R D
$$

jis lowest poins

1) Very large number of sellers: examples include farm commodities, stock market, and foreign exchange markets.
2) Standardized product: if the price is the same, buyers will be indifferent about which seller they buy a "homogeneous" product from.
3) "Price Takers": individual firms exert no significant control over price.
4) Free entry and exit: no obstacles to entry--legal, technological, financial etc.

## Technically, the demand curve of the individual competitive firm is

This does NOT mean that MARKET demand is perfectly elastic. In fact, TOTAL-DEMAND curves for most agricultural products is very INELASTIC.

However, the demand schedule for the INDIVIDUAL firm in a purely competitive industry is PERFECTLY ELASTIC.

## Notice that column 1 is

 price per unit to the buyer but it is also revenue per unit, or AVERAGE REVENUE to the seller.Price and Average Revenue are the (AR=TR / q)

| $p(A R)$ | $q$ | $T R$ | $M R$ |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 150 | 0 | 0 | $]-150$ |
| 150 | 1 | 150 | $]--150$ |
| 150 | 2 | 300 | $]-150$ |
| 150 | 3 | 450 | $]-150$ |
| 150 | 4 | 600 | $]-150$ |
| 150 | 5 | 750 | $]-150$ |
| 150 | 6 | 900 |  | same thing seen from different points of view.



## MARGINAL REVENUE is <br> the extra <br> revenue which results from selling 1 more unit of output.

| P | Q | TR | MR |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $(T R=p \times q)(M R=\wedge T R / \Delta q)$ |  |  |  |
| 150 | 0 | 0 - 150 |  |
| 150 | 1 | ]-150 |  |
| 150 |  |  | ]-150 |
|  |  | 300 ]-150 |  |
| 150 |  |  | ]-150 |
| 150 | 4 | 600 | ]-150 |
| 150 | 5 | 750 |  |
| 150 | 6 |  | ]-150 |

On a graph, $\mathbf{D}=\mathbf{M R}=\mathbf{A R}$ and is considered perfectly elastic.


Because the purely competitive firm is a "price taker", it can maximize its economic profit ONLY by adjusting output.

The firm has a fixed plant.
Therefore, it can adjust output only through change in the amount of variable resources it uses.

The economic profit it seeks by this adjustment is the difference between total revenue and total cost.

# There are 2 ways to determine the level of output at which a competitive firm will realize maximum profit or loss: 

1) compare TR and TC
2) compare MR and MC (we have already done this: the firm compares the amounts that each additional unit of output would add to total revenue and to total cost.)

## Both approaches apply to ALL four basic market structures.

## TOTAL REVENUE - TOTAL COST APPROACH

| Q | TFC | TVC | TC | TR | P/L | It is here that the profit begins to diminish, so profitmaximization is $\$ 280$. |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 0 | 120 | 0 | 120 | 0 | -120 |  |
| 1 | 120 | 70 | 190 | 150 | -40 |  |
| 2 | 120 | 160 | 280 | 300 | 20 |  |
| 3 | 120 | 230 | 350 | 450 | 100 |  |
| 4 | 120 | 300 | 420 | 600 | 180 |  |
| 5 | 120 | 350 | 470 |  | 280 |  |
| 6 | 120 | 510 | 630 | 900 | 270 |  |

# Plotting the TC curve into the graph allows us to see the table more clearly. 



To do Activity 31 through 36, you will NEED to know:

1) $M C=M R$
2) MR PARD
3) $\mathrm{AFC}=\mathrm{FC} /$ output
4) $\mathrm{ATC}=\mathrm{TC} /$ output
5) $\mathrm{AVC}=\mathrm{VC} /$ output
6) Profit $=$ TR - TC
7) Economic profit
8) Economic loss
9) long run vs. short run
10) price taker
11) In LR, all firms operate at ATC (zero economic profit)
12) Side by side graphs
13) If $P$ covers AVC and part AFC, stay in business.
14) If $P$ is below ATC and AVC, shut down.

## TO SHUT-DOWN or NOT TO SHUT-DOWN

## PERFECT COMPETITION



If a firm in incurring LOSSES, it must determine whether it should SHUT DOWN immediately or continue production in the short run.

If a firm continues losses in the long-run, it should always shut-down. But what about the short-run?

## PERFECT COMPETITION



In the situation above, the firm is producing at PROFIT MAXIMIZING output, but is still operating at a loss because P < ATC.
Remember that PROFIT MAXIMIZING and LOSS MINIMIZING are the same concept.

## PERFECT COMPETITION



These are costs that have to be paid EVEN IF THE FIRM SHUTS DOWN.
Remember: AFC = ATC - AVC and it wouldn't matter what
Q we use since AFCs don't depend on output.

## PERFECT COMPETITION



Now we can grasp a very simple rule for shut down.
If $\mathrm{P}>$ AVC (as above) then the firm should operate in the short run.

## PERFECT COMPETITION



If $\mathrm{P}<$ AVC (as above) then the firm should shut down immediately.

In other words, if a firm cannot cover it's FIXED COSTS, then firm should immediately shut down.

## PERFECT COMPETITION



RATIONALE: If price is below AVC, then the firm earns less revenue with each additional unit of output. So the additional revenue is less than the additional cost.

## Questions for Review



# What are the four market models? 

1) Perfect Competition
2) Monopoly
3) Monopolistic Competition
4) Oligopoly

# In all four market models, the optimum production point is found where? 

## $M C=M R$

## In perfect competition, price is determined by - ...

## The industry

# Individual firms are and will take the 

price-takers
market price

# In perfect competition, the price line is labeled how? 

$M R=P=A R=D$

## MR is determined how?

Change in TR divided by change in $q$

## MC touches ATC at what point?

it's lowest

## When ATC is above $P$ line, then the firm is experiencing

 $a$loss

## $P \times q=$

## TR

# In the long run, when individual firms are earning economic profits, what will happen? <br> more firms enter the market causing the industry supply curve to shift up. 

## In the long run ATC should equal ___ at ___.

## $M R=P=A R=D$ at it's

 lowest point.
## PERFECT COMPETITION



Should this firm:
a) Operate as usual
b) $\oint$ perate in the short-run
c) Shutdown

## PERFECT COMPETITION



Should this firm:
a) pperate as usual
b) Operate in the short-run
c) Shutdown

## PERFECT COMPETITION



Should this firm:
a) Operate as usual
b) Operate in the short-run
c) Shutdown

## PURE

## MONOPOLY

## CHARACTERISTICS of MONOPOLY

1) Single seller
2) No close substitutes
3) "Price maker" (.....not "price taker")
4) Blocked Entry
5) Nonprice competition

In a MONOPOLY, the "firm" and the "industry" are the same.

## The market D curve shows the price at which each unit of output can be sold.

## Let's see why this is true:

If Drugs-R-Us sets their own $\mathrm{P}=\$ 5$ on a patented drug, they will sell 1 unit and TR = \$5.


## If Drugs-R-Us lowers P = \$4, they will sell 2 units, resulting in TR = \$8, resulting in a MR = \$3.




When a patent gives a firm a monopoly over the sale of a drug, the firm charges the monopoly price, which is well above the marginal cost of making the drug.

How does the monopolist determine its profit-maximizing output (q)?


So how much profit does the monopoly make? What is the equation for Profit?


## The area of the box A, B, C, E equals the profit for Drugs-R-Us.



## To depict the loss for the monopoly the ATC curve must be above $D$.



# Hopefully, a monopolist would reevaluate his situation and solve the problem so he is making a profit. 



So.....what happens when the patent runs out??

New firms enter the market => More competition =>

Price falls to MC.

0

Price PRICE and REVENUE

$\$ 5$ Price | Pring |
| :---: |
| durint |
| patent |

Quantity after patent

Because a monopoly charges a price above MC, not all consumers who value the good at more than cost will buy it. Thus, the quantity


So far, we have been assuming that the monopoly firm charges the same price to all consumers. In many cases, however, monopolist will use PRICE DISCRIMINATION, or sell the same good to different customers for different prices

This practice is not possible in
competitive markets where there are
many firms selling the same product at competitive prices.

## How does the monopolist decide why and how to price discriminate?

Suppose you are President of Books-R-Us. The newest publication can be sold at differing prices to 2 types of readers:

1) Sell the books to 100,000 die-hard fans who will pay \$30 /book, and/or
2) Sell the books to 400,000 less enthusiastic readers who will pay $\$ 5 / b 00 k$. (which would equal 500,000 total books sold)

## There are 2 options to consider:

## Option 1

100,000
X $\$ 30$
\$ 3 million (revenue)

- 2 million (cost)
\$1 million (profit)


## Option 2

500,000

\$ 2.5 million (revenue)

- 2 million (cost)
\$500,000 (profit)

Notice this decision creates deadweight loss. Books-R-Us produces only 100K books and the quantity produced and sold by them is below the socially efficient level.


But then, Books-R-
Us executives make an important discovery.

It turns out that the 100,000 die hard fans live in Great Britain, and the 400,000 less
enthusiastic readers live in the United States.

Now, the profit/loss calculations look a bit different.

Revenues/GB
\$3m
Revenues/US +\$2m
Total Revenue
\$5m
Cost
$-\$ 2 \mathrm{~m}$
Profit

## Three Lessons:

1) Price discrimination is a profitmaximizing strategy for the monopolist.
2) Price discrimination requires ability to separate customers dependant upon their willingness to pay. (young/old...geographical...day/night shoppers...etc._ )
However, aifjitage can prevent this from happening. Arejitrage is tife buying of ais fiess at alower price aisel resellifg it if a sfarcset to get the filjiser price.
3) Price discrimination can raise economic welfare. By selling the books at differing prices in two different markets, more people actually purchased the book. It eliminates the inefficiency in monopoly pricing by eliminating the deadweight loss.

Graph A Show a monopolist that charges the same price to all customers. Total surplus in this market equals the sum of profit (producer surplus) and consumer surplus.
Graph B shows a monopolist that can perfectly price discriminate. Consumer surplus is zero, total surplus now equals the firm's profit.

Comparing these two panels, you can see that perfect price discrimination raises profit, raises total surplus, and lowers consumer surplus.


## Examples of Price

Discrimination include:

1) Movie tickets
2) Airline prices
3) Discount coupons
4) Financlal aid
5) Quantity discounts

To do Activity 37 through 43, you will NEED to know:

1) $M C=M R$
2) $M C$
3) $\mathrm{ATC}=\mathrm{TC} /$ output
4) $M R$
5) $\mathrm{AR}=\mathrm{D}=\mathrm{P}$
6) Profit $=$ TR - TC
7) price maker
8) the firm and the industry are one

## The <br> OLIGOPOLY

An oligopoly has:

1) few sellers
2) similar/identical product

| $Q$ (gal) | $P$ | TR |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | :--- |
| 0 | $\$ 120$ | $\$ 0$ |  |
| 10 | 110 | 1100 |  |
| 20 | 100 | 2000 |  |
| 30 | 90 | 2700 |  |
| 40 | 80 | 3200 |  |
| 50 |  | 70 | 3500 |
| 60 |  | 60 | 3600 |
| 70 | 50 | 3500 |  |
| 80 |  | 40 | 3200 |
| 90 | 30 | 2700 |  |
| 100 | 20 | 2000 |  |
| 110 | 10 | 1100 |  |
| 120 | 0 | 0 |  |

Let's consider a town's demand for water and the table to the right. If you graphed these two columns of numbers, you would get a standard downward sloping demand curve.

> There is no cost to pumping the water so the TOTAL REVENUE = TOTAL PROFTJ.

Consider first what would happen if the market for water were PERFECTLY COMPETITIVE:

| $\mathbf{Q}$ (gal) |  | TR |
| :---: | ---: | ---: |
| 0 | $\$ 120$ | $\$ 0$ |
| 10 | 110 | 1100 |
| 20 | 100 | 2000 |
| 30 | 90 | 2700 |
| 40 | 80 | 3200 |
| 50 | 70 | 3500 |
| 60 | 60 | 3600 |
| 70 | 50 | 3500 |
| 80 | 40 | 3200 |
| 90 | 30 | 2700 |
| 100 | 20 | 2000 |
| 110 | 10 | 1100 |
| 120 | 0 | 0 |

In competitive market, the production decisions of each firm drive price equal to Marginal Cost.

## WHAT IS THE MC FOR WATER?

ZERO

So the equilibrium price would be:
ZERO

The equilibrium quantity would be:
I20 gallons

The price of water would reflect the cost of production, and the efficient quantity of water would be produced and consumed.

| $Q$ (gal) | $P$ | TR |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | :--- |
| 0 | $\$ 120$ | $\$ 0$ |  |
| 10 | 110 | 1100 |  |
| 20 | 100 | 2000 |  |
| 30 | 90 | 2700 |  |
| 40 | 80 | 3200 |  |
| 50 |  | 70 | 3500 |
| 60 |  | 60 | 3600 |
| 70 | 50 | 3500 |  |
| 80 |  | 40 | 3200 |
| 90 | 30 | 2700 |  |
| 100 | 20 | 2000 |  |
| 110 | 10 | 1100 |  |
| 120 | 0 | 0 |  |

How would a monopolist handle this market?

## WHERE IS TOTAL PROFIT MAXIMIZED? <br> $$
\$ 3600(Q=\sigma 0, P=\sigma 0)
$$

The profit maximizing monopolist would produce this Q and charge this P. P would be $>$ MR.

The result would be inefficient as the quantity of water produced and consumed would be far below the socially efficient level of 120 gallons.

What would happen in the oligopoly?

Let's suppose that we are dealing with a simple form of the oligopoly with only two members, called a DUOPOLY. We'll call the companies HECKLE and JECKLE.

1) One possibility would be for the two companies to get together and decide on $Q$ and $P$.

This agreement is called COLLUSION and the two companies would now be called a CARTEL.

In this situation, the two companies would produce at monopolist Q and $P$.

Once again, $\mathrm{P}>\mathrm{MC}$ and the outcome would be socially inefficient.


| $\mathbf{Q}$ (gal) |  | TR |
| :---: | ---: | ---: |
| 0 | $\$ 120$ | $\$ 0$ |
| 10 | 110 | 1100 |
| 20 | 100 | 2000 |
| 30 | 90 | 2700 |
| 40 | 80 | 3200 |
| 50 | 70 | 3500 |
| 60 | 60 | 3600 |
| 70 | 50 | 3500 |
| 80 | 40 | 3200 |
| 90 | 30 | 2700 |
| 100 | 20 | 2000 |
| 110 | 10 | 1100 |
| 120 | 0 | 0 |

Now, Heckle and Jeckle must agree on their share of the market.

If they split the market equally, each would produce 30 how many gallons?

P would be

Profit would be

As a matter of public policy, however, antitrust laws prohibit explicit agreements between oligopolists.


So what happens if Heckle and Jeckle decide to produce independently??

| $\mathbf{Q}$ (gal) |  | TR |
| :---: | ---: | ---: |
| 0 | $\$ 120$ | $\$ 0$ |
| 10 | 110 | 1100 |
| 20 | 100 | 2000 |
| 30 | 90 | 2700 |
| 40 | 80 | 3200 |
| 50 | 70 | 3500 |
| 60 | 60 | 3600 |
| 70 | 50 | 3500 |
| 80 | 40 | 3200 |
| 90 | 30 | 2700 |
| 100 | 20 | 2000 |
| 110 | 10 | 1100 |
| 120 | 0 | 0 |

Suppose that Heckle expects Jeckle to produce 30 gallons. His thinking might reflect the following logic:
Heckle could produce 30 gallons as well resulting in the market equaling the 60 gallon efficiency point. His profit would be $\$ 1800$

OR Heckle could produce 40 gallons resulting in 70 gallons in the market and water would be sold at

$$
\$ 50 / 0 \mathrm{j}=1
$$

Heckle's profit would be $\$ 2000$

| $\underline{Q}_{\text {(ga) }}$ | P |  | Of course, Jeckle |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 0 | \$120 | \$ 0 |  |  |
| 10 | 110 | 1100 | might reason the |  |
| 20 | 100 | 2000 | same way. |  |
| 30 | 90 | 2700 |  |  |
| 40 | 80 | 3200 |  |  |
| 50 | 70 | 3500 | Heckle and Jeckle producing 40 gallons. Total sales would |  |
| 60 | 60 | 3600 | be 80 gellons |  |
| 70 | 50 | 3500 |  |  |
| 80 | 40 | 3200 | P would fall to | \$ $30 / \mathrm{f}$ /galJos |
| 90 | 30 | 2700 |  |  |
| 100 | 20 | 2000 | Heckle and Jeckle's profit would be | $\% 1600$ |
| 110 | 10 | 1100 |  |  |
| 20 | 0 | 0 |  |  |


| $\mathbf{Q}$ (gal) |  | TR |
| :---: | ---: | ---: |
| 0 | $\$ 120$ | $\$ 0$ |
| 10 | 110 | 1100 |
| 20 | 100 | 2000 |
| 30 | 90 | 2700 |
| 40 | 80 | 3200 |
| 50 | 70 | 3500 |
| 60 | 60 | 3600 |
| 70 | 50 | 3500 |
| 80 | 40 | 3200 |
| 90 | 30 | 2700 |
| 100 | 20 | 2000 |
| 110 | 10 | 1100 |
| 120 | 0 | 0 |

## Now, a new logic enters the picture:

Heckle's profit is $\$ 1600$. He COULD increase his production to 50 but the market would then be

P would fall to \$30/0jeljos

Heckle's profit would be

He would probably conclude he is better off producing 40 gallons.

This outcome is called NASH EQUILIBRIUM, which is a situation where economic actors interacting with each other each choose their best strategy given the strategies that others have choosen. This is also called GAME THEORY.


John Nash
1994 Nobel Prize,
Economics

## In this case, Heckle

 decides to produce 40 gallons based on the fact that Jeckle is producing 40 gallons.AND, because Heckle decides to produce 40 gallons, Jeckle also decides to produce 40 gallons.
Once they reach this NASH EQUILIBRIUM, neither one has the incentive to change their strategy.

Game Theory can also be illustrated by what is called THE PRISONER'S DILEMMA.

The police have enough evidence to convict Bonnie and Clyde of possession of an illegal firearm so that each would spend 1 year in jail. But they suspect that the two have pulled off some bank robberies but they have no evidence. They put Bonnie and Clyde in separate rooms and offer a deal.
"Right now, we can lock you up for one year. But if you testify against your partner, we will set you free and your partner will get 20 years in prison. If you both confess to the crime, we can avoid the cost of a trial and you both get 8 years."

Each prisoner has two strategies, confess or remain silent. However, the sentence that each gets depends upon the actions of the other.

## Bonnie's Decision <br> confess <br> Remain silent

confess
Clyde's
Decision
Remain
silent

| 8 years each | Bonnie - 20 yrs <br> Clyde goes free |
| :--- | :---: |
| Bonnie goes free <br> Clyde -20 yrs. | 1 year each |

OR you can use the PAYOFF MATRIX


In the real world, this dilemma is played out by real players. Once a negotiation is reached, each country must decide whether they should keep their agreement.

| High Iran's prod. Decision | Iraq's Decision <br> High prod. Low prod. |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | \$40 billion each | Iraq - $\$ 30$ billion <br> Iran - $\$ 60$ billion |
| Low prod. | Iraq - $\$ 60$ billion <br> Iran - \$30 billion | \$50 billion each |

## It can be used in the arms race......



## Or with companies using common resources....

| Drill 2 <br> Arco's <br> wells Decision | Exxon's DecisionDrill 2 wells $\quad \begin{gathered}\text { Drill } 1 \text { well }\end{gathered}$ |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | \$4 million profit each | Exxon-\$3m pr Arco-\$6m pr |
| Drill 1 well | Exxon-\$6m pr Arco-\$3m pr | \$5m profit each |

# The SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT (1890) elevated 

 agreements between oligopolists from an unenforceable contract to criminal conspiracy.The CLAYTON ACT (1914) stated that if a person could prove that he was damaged by an illegal arrangement to restraint of trade, that person could sue and receive three times the damages.

These laws are used to prevent oligopolists from acting together in ways that would make their markets less competitive.

The slope of a noncollusive oligopolist's demand and marginal revenue curves depends on whether its rivals match ( $D_{1}$ and $M R_{1}$ ) or ignore ( $D_{2}$ and $M R_{2}$ ) any price changes..


Assume the going prices are $P_{0}$ and $Q_{0}$.
The kinked demand curve shows that demand is highly elastic above the going price $P_{0}$ and much less elastic or inelastic below that price.


QUANTITY DEMANDED


QUANTITY DEMANDED

Because of the sharp difference in elasticity of demand above and below the going price, there is a gap in the marginal revenue curve.


QUANTITY DEMANDED


QUANTITY DEMANDED

## It makes sense that rivals will probably follow a price cut, but ignore an increase.

The kinked demand curve gives each oligopolist reason to believe that any change in price will be for the worse.

If it raises its price, many of its customers will desert it.

If it lowers its price, its sales at best will increase very modestly since rivals will match the lower price.

## MONOPOLISTIC

COMPETITION

Each firm in a monopolistically competitive market is, in many ways, like a monopoly.


## If price exceed ATC, the firm makes a profit (short-term).



## If ATC exceeds price, the firm takes a loss (short-term).



When firms are taking losses, there is an incentive to exit, causing a increase in demand for products from the firms staying in the market (and higher profit).

This process of entry and exit continues until the firms in the market are making exactly zero economic profit. (LONG-RUN EQUILIBRIUM)


Monopolistically competitive firms produce less than what is efficient. Also, price is


Because monopolistically competitive firms produce less than what is efficient, they are said to have EXCESS CAPACITY.


Monpolistically competitive firms, unlike a perfectly competitive firms, can increase the quantity they produce and lower the average total cost of production.

Once source of inefficiency is markup of price over marginal cost. Some consumers will be deterred from buying it.


A key difference between Perfect Competition and Monopolistic Competition is the relationship between $P$ and MC. In a competitive firm, MC = P. Therefore, selling one more unit would equal zero profit.


Notice also that the monopolistically competitive firm has the deadweight loss of the monopoly.


## Inefficiency of Monopolistic Competition:

1) P over MC: not socially efficient, some people will not buy because of the markup, which causes deadweight loss.
2) Number of firms in the market may be too many or too little

## In what ways does ADVERTISING affect monopolistic competition?

Critics of advertising and brand names argue that firms use them to take advantage of consumer irrationality and to reduce competition.

Defenders of advertising and brand names argue that firms use them to inform customers and to compete more vigorously on price and product quality.

# LONG-RUN 

## VS.

## SHORTRUN

# SHORT-RUN: when at least one factor of production is fixed. 

LONG-RUN: when all the factors of production are variable.

## ECONOMIES OF SCALE

ECONOMIES OF SCALE: When long-run average total cost declines as output increases.

DISECONOMIES OF SCALE: When long-run average total cost rises as output increases.

CONSTANT RETURNS TO SCALE: When long-run average total cost does not vary with the level of output.

ATC in short

ATC in short
Average Total Cost run w/small

| Average Total |
| :--- |
| Cost |

Economies
Of Scale

CAUSES of economies or diseconomies of scale:

1) Specialization of workers will be found in higher production levels of economies of scale.

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